Summary
Recent research by Stacey Tevlin and Karl Whelan in the United States has shown that aggregate economic models fail to explain the investment boom in real plant and machinery in the second half of the 1990s. In contrast, a disaggregate modelling approach does much better. This appears to reflect two factors. First, aggregate models do not capture the increase in replacement investment associated with compositional shifts in the capital stock towards shorter-lived assets, such as computers. Second, aggregate models invariably find little or no role for the real user cost of capital, so they understate the positive effects of falls in the relative price of computers on investment in computers.
The United Kingdom also experienced a boom in real plant and machinery investment in the second half of the 1990s. But undertaking similar research is beset with difficulties in the United Kingdom, not least the relative paucity of disaggregate investment data in the published National Accounts. In this paper, we carefully construct a dataset for the United Kingdom that is consistent with the National Accounts. We then use this to investigate the ability of different investment equations to account for the UK investment boom in plant and machinery. We report similar results to Stacey Tevlin and Karl Whelan for the United States. In particular, the traditional aggregate modelling approach completely fails to explain the investment boom in plant and machinery in the second half of the 1990s.
Our analysis consists of two main elements: a theoretical section setting out the relationship between aggregate and disaggregate approaches to modelling investment; and an empirical analysis setting out our econometric results.
In our theoretical analysis, we first derive the relationship between firms' desired capital stocks and the real user cost of capital that is predicted by standard economic theory. We show how that relationship breaks down in the presence of trend falls in the relative price of investment goods. Such trends have been a particularly important feature of investment in recent years. In contrast, we show that well-specified relationships exist at the disaggregate level.
Our empirical exercise involves using time-series cointegration methods to model investment at disaggregate and aggregate levels. We compare the ability of the two approaches to explain the boom in plant and machinery investment. Recognising that cointegration techniques can have low power, particularly in small samples, we further evaluate the comparative performance of the two approaches by conducting out of sample forecasting exercises.
In all cases, our empirical results support the theoretically superior disaggregate modelling approach. First, compositional shifts in the capital stock towards shorter-lived computer assets appear to have been important in the United Kingdom too in the second half of the 1990s. That explains some, though not all, of the inability of the aggregate model to explain the investment boom. The second factor behind the strong investment growth has been falls in the relative price of computers. Echoing the finding of Stacey Tevlin and Karl Whelan for the United States, we find that firms' investment in computers appears to be highly sensitive to falls in the real user cost for computers. And interestingly, our models suggest that the increase in the size of firms' computer capital stocks in the second half of the 1990s are fully accounted for by the sharp falls in the real user cost for computers.
Given the great uncertainties surrounding measures of the real user cost of capital and the price of investment goods in particular, we investigate the sensitivity of our results to alternative measures of the real user cost of capital. We find that our results are reassuringly robust. In all they provide strong support to attempts to model and forecast investment at the disaggregate level.
1.Introduction
Traditional attempts to model investment using time-series methods have for the most part been unsuccessful (1) .
. At best, only a limited role is found for the real user cost of capital. And the overall fit of investment equations is invariably poor. That is particularly true of the 1990s, when these models failed to predict the rapid real investment growth in the United Kingdom and in the United States.
A host of explanations have been put forward in the literature for the failure of time-series investment equations. These include (a) mismeasurement of structural variables such as the real user cost or marginal q (2) ; (b) aggregation biases (3) ; and (c) estimation biases (4) . In this paper we suggest that at least part of the difficulty arises because aggregate investment equations do not hold when differences across assets are important.
In particular, the long run of investment equations is typically designed to satisfy the properties of a one-sector model. But that model cannot account for the persistent shifts in the relative prices of different investment goods that we observe in the data (5) . We argue in section 2 that the aggregate relationship between capital, output and the real user cost of capital breaks down in the presence of such trends in relative prices.
Having established misspecification of the aggregate equation, we then illustrate its empirical importance for the United Kingdom. In section 3 we summarise the main properties of our dataset for plant and machinery investment, including and excluding computers. In section 4 we follow the work of Tevlin and Whelan (2002) (2) See, for example, Chirinko (1993) .
(3) See, for example, Caballero (1999) , in which the author illustrates that, in general, information about the crosssectional distribution of capital imbalances is needed to explain aggregate investment. This has motivated attempts to model investment at the micro level. See, for example, Bond et al (2002) .
(4) Caballero (1994) suggested that traditional estimation approaches downwardly bias estimates of the elasticity of the cost of capital with respect to the capital-output ratio. The poor performance of traditional time-series investment equations has also been attributed by some to factors such as financing constraints and the irreversibility of investment under conditions of uncertainty.
(5) As discussed in OECD (2001a), the relative price of capital goods in most countries has trended down, at least since the early 1980s. See also Bakhshi and Larsen (2001) , for a discussion of UK developments, and Whelan (2001), for a US perspective.
analysis within an explicit cointegrating framework. Given the inherent measurement difficulties, we take particular care to investigate the sensitivity of our results to alternative measures of the real user cost. Finally, in section 5, we compare out-of-sample forecasts from the disaggregate equations with forecasts generated from the traditional, aggregate model of plant and machinery investment. Like Tevlin and Whelan for the US, we find that our asset-level investment equations can together generate much more accurate forecasts of plant and machinery investment compared with the (misspecified) aggregate approach.
The theory
Investment in the United Kingdom in recent decades has been characterised by persistent shifts in the relative price of investment goods. That has manifested itself in two main ways. First, there has been a decline in the price of investment goods, such as plant and machinery, relative to prices in the economy as a whole (see chart 1) (6) . Second, there have been shifts in the price of high-tech investment goods relative to other investment goods. Chart 2 demonstrates that computer prices have fallen dramatically relative to the price of non-computer plant and machinery. 6 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 Ratio of plant and machinery investment good deflator to GDP deflator (in logs) 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 Ratio of computer prices to noncomputer plant and machinery prices (in logs)
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In this section we show how easy it is for an aggregate investment equation to go wrong when the relative prices of capital goods are changing.
Let the production function for the whole economy (or for a sector) take the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form:
______________________________________________________________________________________________ (6) This has also been a feature of investment for many other industrialised countries. See OECD (2001a). For a full discussion of the UK trends see Bakhshi and Thompson (2002) .
[ ]
Here we assume that output is produced by two types of capital, computer capital ("exciting", labelled subscript e) and non-computer capital ("dull", labelled subscript d), and by labour hours (h). 
Taking logs and then differentiating with respect to time,
where lower case letters denote logs and a dot denotes a time derivative.
The real user cost is given by the Hall-Jorgenson formula 8 :
where t i P is the asset price, measured relative to the price of output, t r is the real rate of return (ie the nominal rate minus the growth rate of the price of output), i d is the depreciation rate, and
is the growth rate of the relative price of asset i.
The interpretation of the production function as being for the whole economy can be rigorously justified in two ways. Either we can assume that the two types of capital good are imported, in which case domestic output is of some third good. Or we can assume that the home economy produces one of the capital goods while the other is imported. If the home economy produces more than one good, then an aggregate production function can only be justified if some restrictions are put on technology. This is what the model of Greenwood et al (1997) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 9 See OECD (2001b) and Oulton (2001b) for the theory of capital services measurement. The alternative aggregate measure is the aggregate capital stock, the "wealth stock" measure of aggregate capital.
The expression in square brackets looks like a price index for aggregate investment, but it is not identical to this latter concept since the weights are not the same. The weight w is the share of non-computer capital in aggregate capital services. In a price index for investment, the corresponding share is the share of non-computer investment in aggregate investment; these shares are not the same. So if we use an aggregate index of capital services on the left hand side and an aggregate price index for investment on the right hand side, there will be an inconsistency and any econometric estimates based on these measures will be biased. The only case when the bias disappears is when the two asset prices are growing at the same rate relative to the price of output, ie relative to each other asset prices are constant, in which case the weights do not matter.
Otherwise, the typical aggregate measure of the real user cost will be misleading.
The derivation of equation (7) Notice too that the aggregate I/K ratio is likely to drift up over time if the pattern of investment is shifting towards assets with short lives, since depreciation will become increasingly important.
Hence it is a mistake to treat the aggregate depreciation rate as a constant when an aggregate version of equation (8) is estimated, a point to which we return below.
These issues suggest there are important misspecification problems that arise when estimating aggregate investment equations when relative prices are trending. That points to a disaggregate approach to modelling investment.
Stylised facts
This section considers the key features of our dataset (details of the construction of this dataset are given in Appendices 1 and 2; summary statistics of the series are provided in table A3.8 of Appendix 3).
Capital stock
The capital stock as a share of GDP appears highly trended for aggregate plant and machinery and its computer component, but less obviously so for non-computer plant and machinery (chart 3).
Cost of capital
Chart 4 shows our estimates of the real user cost of capital (as defined in equation 4) for aggregate plant and machinery and, at the asset level, for computers and non-computers (11) . In each case, there is evidence of a downward trend, although this is rather less pronounced in the non-computer case. gain, and tax factor terms described above.
Charts 5 and 6 show that for our assets, at both the aggregate and disaggregate level, the 'price'
and 'non-price' elements exhibit very different persistence trends. The price series are trended, as the price of capital goods has fallen relative to general output prices. This is particularly true for computers where quality-adjusted prices have fallen dramatically, less so for non-computer plant and machinery. But there is little obvious trend to the non-price components.
12 ______________________________________________________________________________________________ (12) Although (our alternative measures of) the cost of finance declined in the latter half of the 1990s, the non-price cost of capital actually rose. This reflects declines in our capital gain term over this period, which tended to raise the cost of capital. Note that the sharp movements between 1992 and 1994 in the non-price cost of capital series for noncomputer plant and machinery reflect sharp movements in this asset's deflator, most notably in 1992 Q4 when it fell by some 9%. This causes a sharp fall in our capital gain term and a sharp rise in the non-price cost of capital at this time. Since we measure our capital gain term as a trailing eight-quarter moving average, there is also a corresponding fall in the non-price cost of capital eight quarters later, as can be seen in chart 6. As discussed in appendix 4, alternative capital gain terms have no material impact on the results we report in section 4.
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Depreciation
Chart 7 shows that the estimated aggregate depreciation rate for plant and machinery has risen quite sharply in recent years (13) . And that is consistent with the US experience too (14) . 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
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We first consider the stationarity properties of our variables. Table 1 shows the results from formal unit root tests. (4) PP ( D k/y -3.6** -2.6 -6.9** -7.3** -3.6* -2.6 -6.9** -7.3** machinery r -1.3 -1.2 -1.7 -1.6 -2.6 -2.0 -3.6* -3.8* D r -9.4** -4.2** -13.7** -14.7** -9.3** -4.2** -13.6** -14.6**
.2** -12.6** -13.2** -8.3** -4.3** -12.6** -13.4** Non-computers k/y -0.9 -2.0 -0.6 -1.1 -1.6 -2.9 -1.6 -2.0 D k/y -3.4* -2.6 -6.8** -7.2** -3.5* -2.5 -6.7** -7.2** r -1.8 -1.7 -1.9 -1.8 -1.9 -1.7 -2.4 -2.5 D r -8.4** -3.6** -12.7** -13.0** -8.4** -3.7** -12.7** -13.1** Notes:
1. Asterisks signify null hypothesis of unit root rejected at 5% (* )or 1% (**) level. 2. ADF() and PP() indicate Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, where number in brackets is number of lagged first difference terms in test regression.
Although the results are somewhat mixed, depending on the model-DGP combination, taken together the tests broadly suggest that the capital-output ratio and the real user cost are nonstationary at both the aggregate and disaggregate level. We proceed on the assumption that the variables are all I (1).
Our estimation strategy is two-fold. First, we examine the relationship between the capital-output ratio and the real user cost in a cointegration framework, given the non-stationarity of these variables. Evidence of cointegration means that either investment or capital dynamics can be described by an error correction mechanism (ECM), with accelerator and dynamic user cost terms describing dynamics around a long-run equilibrium relationship between the capital-output ratio and the real user cost. Given our interest in gross investment, we focus on investment rather than capital dynamics.
15
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 15 Note that on the assumption of non-zero depreciation, it follows from the capital accumulation identity that investment and the capital stock are integrated of the same order and cointegrate.
Second, we exploit any covariance between the shocks driving computer and non-computer investment by estimating the asset-level equations using Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR)
techniques. That also allows us to test explicitly the CES cross-equation restriction that the elasticity of substitution between capital inputs is equal in the two equations. We take the significance of the ECM coefficient in our SUR equations at the asset level to be evidence for a cointegrating relationship, even though the critical values on the t-statistic will not in general have precisely the same distribution as in Banerjee et al (1986) 's analysis of single equation cointegration tests based on OLS (16) (17) . Given the well-known low power of cointegration tests in small samples, we also implement the system-based Johansen cointegration test (18) and the dynamic OLS method, as robustness checks on our results (19) . Equation (9) summarises the system we estimate using SUR techniques. Note there is a crossequation restriction on the elasticity of substitution, s being the same in the two equations, which we test in our empirical work. To facilitate comparison with Tevlin and Whelan (2002) for the United States, we also report results for their specification (we call these investment rate equations (equation 11) as distinct from our dynamic investment growth equations (equation (10)). These should in principle be inferior to our dynamic equations as they make no use of the information contained in the long-run relationship between the variables.
______________________________________________________________________________________________ (16) Single equation tests are valid in this context, as the investment equations we estimate are bivariate and so there can at most be one cointegrating vector. And the regressors are always found to be weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters of interest.
(17) For all our single equations, we adopted a general-to-specific estimation approach in order to obtain a parsimonious dynamic specification. Specifically, we tested down from a general model containing eight lags of the dynamic terms, to a parsimonious dynamic specification containing only terms significant at the 10% level.
(18) In order to determine the appropriate lag structure for our VECMs in the Johansen test, we first estimated unrestricted VARs over our full sample period (1978Q1-1999Q4). Lag length was then determined by lag length selection criteria, subject to the VAR passing serial correlation tests.
(19) Specifically, we implemented the dynamic OLS method suggested by Saikkonen (1991) and Stock and Watson (1993) of adding dynamic leads and lags of regressors to a levels regression, in order to check the robustness of estimated elasticities. We also applied the Banerjee et al (1998) ECM version of this test, in which leads of the regressors are added to an ECM specification, as a further test of cointegration. We report results from regressions including two leads, but results were not sensitive to number of leads chosen.
Of course, the estimation results reported below are only as good as the dataset underlying it.
Given the absence of official estimates in the UK for many of the series in our econometric analysis, we need to make a number of assumptions (discussed in Appendix 1). That leaves our results potentially open to the criticism that they reflect mismeasurement of the variables of interest. We go some way to address this in a thorough sensitivity analysis. In particular, we investigate the robustness of our results to a range of alternative measures of the real user cost, to computer price mismeasurement and to different interpolation techniques used to derive a quarterly investment dataset. Appendix 4 shows how these changes reassuringly have no material impact on our results.
Aggregate plant and machinery
In our equation for plant and machinery, we find only weak evidence of cointegration using both single-equation and system techniques (for full results see tables A1 and A2 in Appendix 3). In the single equation case, the ECM coefficient has a t-statistic of -2.2 (similar results were obtained using the Banerjee et al (1998) dynamic OLS procedure). This t-statistic is respectable compared to the usual student-t critical values, but is low compared with the critical values tabulated by Banerjee et al (1986) . Using the Johansen approach, neither the maximumeigenvalue test nor the trace test indicate cointegration at the 20% significance level (see table A7 in appendix 3) (20) . Chart 8 reports fitted values against actual outturns of investment growth from the model. The estimated response of investment to the real user cost of capital is small: its elasticity with respect to the capital-output ratio is only -0.3 (21) . ( 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 Investment growth equation 06 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 Investment rate equation That suggests that compositional shifts in the capital stock towards higher depreciation rate computers can explain some, though not all, of the puzzle. 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 Residuals from investment rate equation suggests that the contribution to investment growth in the second half of the 1990s from relative price falls, through the dynamic user cost terms, is minimal. In particular, according to that equation, the fall in the price of investment relative to final output explains around only one-fifth of the 71% rise in investment over that period. That is at least suggestive that an important source of investment growth, the rapid decline in computer prices in chart 2, is missing in the aggregate equation.
Computers
Tables A3 and A5 in Appendix 3 summarise the results from SUR estimation of investment equations for computers and non-computer plant and machinery separately. For computers, the ECM coefficient has a t-statistic of -3.5 (and -3.7 in the Banerjee et al (1998) dynamic OLS case). That t-statistic is high relative to the usual student t-critical values, but is modest compared with the critical values tabulated by Banerjee et al (1986) in their analysis of single equations estimated using OLS. In any case, the appropriate critical values would be sensitive to the particular DGP-model combination in hand. And, as discussed in Maddala and Kim (1998), the Banerjee et al critical values do not take into account the fact that a restriction that the ECM coefficient equals zero also implies that the coefficient on the real user cost of capital equals zero.
For computers, the Johansen cointegration tests also provide some evidence for cointegration between the capital-output ratio and the real user cost (22) . Trace and maximum eigenvalue tests point towards cointegration at the 20% level (see table A7 in appendix 3). Considered together, we conclude from these results that there is some evidence of cointegration in the case of computers (23) .
As in Tevlin and Whelan (2002) , the estimated response of investment to the real user cost of capital for computers is very high, with an elasticity of -1.3 (24) . (This is robust to the alternative dynamic OLS and Johansen estimation approaches -see table 2 .) The equation now broadly captures the pattern of investment over the sample, though still struggles to match the precise dynamics and the 1998 boom in particular.
Consistent with these results, there is also a significant role for the real user cost of capital in the investment rate equation (10) for computers. The coefficients on the dynamic real user cost of capital terms this time sum to a much higher -3.3. But given the evidence above for a long-run equilibrium relationship between the real user cost and the stock of computers, we would certainly put less weight on an equation that makes no use of this information.
Non-computer plant and machinery
In contrast with the results for computers, there is little evidence of cointegration in the noncomputer case. In the SUR model, the ECM and cost of capital terms are insignificant in the cointegrating vector; the cost of capital term is also incorrectly signed. These results are echoed in the Johansen and dynamic OLS tests (see tables 5 and 6 in Appendix 3). While in the three-lag system, the trace test supports cointegration at the 20% level, the real user cost of capital is again incorrectly signed. Given the lack of evidence for cointegration, we estimate a variant of the investment growth equation (9) that excludes the error correction term. In this case too, there is little role for real user cost terms (25) . ______________________________________________________________________________________________ (22) We estimate our system over three lags, given that there was evidence of serial correlation at two lags, the number suggested by lag order selection criteria. Allowing for an outlier, the equation diagnostics are satisfactory.
(23) Note that the single equation ECM approach is a robust method of estimating a cointegrating relationship only if the variables other than the dependent variable are weakly exogenous with respect to the parameters of interest. To test that, we estimate a VAR in k/y and r with the estimated long-run relationship included as an exogenous variable. The estimated long-run relationship is only significant in the k/y equation, indicating that r is indeed weakly exogenous.
(24) Interestingly, the estimated long run suggests that the actual capital-output ratio was close to its equilibrium level in the late-1990s. In other words, our equation suggests that the rise in the computer capital-output ratio is fully accounted for by the sharp falls in the computer cost of capital.
(25) As in the aggregate case, we still struggle to find a role for the cost of capital when we exclude the ECM term: only one term is significant at the 10% level in the equation's dynamics, and that term is positively signed.
The negative evidence of cointegration for non-computers appears robust to model specification:
there is no role for the real user cost of capital in Tevlin and Whelan's investment rate specification. Though interestingly, even for non-computer plant and machinery, the underestimation of the investment rate in the late-1990s is much less pronounced than in the aggregate case.
The CES assumption: a diagnostic test
Our earlier assumption that firms' production technologies can be described by a CES production function has the effect of imposing a cross-equation restriction on our equations for computers and plant and machinery excluding computers. In particular, the elasticity of substitution for both types of capital should be equal. A LR test of this restriction on our equations estimated using SUR is not rejected at conventional significance levels. But it is apparent that that result reflects the poorly determined elasticity of non-computers with respect to the real user cost. In absolute terms the estimated elasticity of substitution for computers, at -1.3, is much greater than that estimated for non-computers (which is not significantly different to zero). That result again echoes Tevlin and Whelan's finding for the United States.
Given the poorly determined elasticity outside computers, we offer two potential explanations for both the UK and US results. The first, discussed by Tevlin and Whelan (2002) , is consistent with the CES production function. They argue that the estimated elasticity of substitution will be greater for capital inputs where shocks to the real user cost are more persistent, compared with shocks that are temporary. Intuitively, profit-maximising firms will respond by a greater amount in their investment decisions to shocks that are perceived to be more persistent. Tevlin and Whelan (2002) further argue that shocks to the real user cost of capital for computers are likely to reflect the long-run tendency for technological progress in the computer sector to exceed that in other plant and machinery. In that case reductions in the real user cost are likely to be driven by trend declines in the relative price of computers. We have seen that the evidence for the UK is clearly also consistent with that explanation: see Charts 5-6.
An alternative explanation is that the CES production function itself is an inadequate description of the substitutability between computers and other forms of plant and machinery. As a diagnostic on this hypothesis we experimented including the real user cost measure for computers in a single-equation for non-computer plant and machinery. Interestingly, that variable is statistically significant and positive -an increase in the real user cost for computers leads to an increase in demand for non-computer capital. Including this variable also has dramatic implications for the equilibrium properties of the equation, in that there is now evidence for cointegration: the t-statistic on the ECM term jumps to -4.2, and the non-computer cost of capital term is correctly signed and significant. Experimenting with production technologies that are more flexible than the CES case is clearly an area worthy of further research.
Forecasting
Given the rather mixed evidence for cointegration, even at the disaggregate level, a critical test of our analysis is whether the disaggregate equations can better capture the strength of investment in the second half of the 1990s when compared with the aggregate equation. We investigate this by re-estimating the equations over the period 1978Q1 to 1994Q4, and generating out-of-sample forecasts for the second half of the 1990s, conditional on actual outturns for each of the explanatory variables.
Charts 11 and 12 shows how the disaggregate model can now explain the investment boom of the latter half of the 1990s. Both aggregate and disaggregate models struggle to capture the precise dynamics of plant and machinery investment. But unlike the forecasts from the aggregate equations, the aggregate investment profiles implied by the disaggregate equations are broadly in line with the strong investment outturns during this period.
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-15 Out-of-sample forecasts from investment growth equations Out-of-sample forecasts suggest that our asset-level investment equations can together generate far more accurate forecasts of plant and machinery investment compared with the (misspecified) aggregate model. These findings support attempts to model, and forecast, investment at the asset level.
Appendix 1: Constructing the UK dataset
Our dataset consists of quarterly series over 1978 Q1-1999 Q4 for real investment, real capital stock and the real user cost of capital -all calculated separately for aggregate plant and machinery, and at the asset level, for computers and non-computer plant and machinery. Our preferred output measure would be the value added of just those sectors using plant and machinery. But that is not available. We use instead GDP at constant (1995) prices (ONS alias code: ABMM). A brief discussion of how we constructed this dataset is provided below; ONS alias codes are provided in brackets where relevant.
Investment
Our real plant and machinery investment series is published by the ONS in the Quarterly National Accounts as 'other machinery and equipment' investment (DLWO). Deriving quarterly disaggregated series is problematic, as the ONS does not publish computer investment data on a quarterly basis. We follow the approach of Oulton (2001a) We then interpolate these annual data to get a quarterly series, using the statistical procedure described in Chow and Lin (1971) . That involves using an indicator variable to inform the quarterly profile of our known annual series. Given the high correlation between nominal computer investment and plant and machinery investment at the annual frequency -growth rates have a correlation coefficient of over 0.6 for our sample period -we use published, quarterly, nominal plant and machinery investment series as our indicator (TLPW). Further details are provided in appendix 2. We then deflate the (interpolated) quarterly, nominal computer investment series by the corresponding quarterly, ONS producer price index (PQEK) to obtain our real computer investment series.
The ONS does not publish constant price investment data for the level of plant and machinery investment excluding computers. And deriving this component is non-trivial, given the nonadditivity of published ONS fixed-weight series prior to 1994. The approach we take is to estimate the series that the ONS would have arrived at, had they decided to exclude computers from plant and machinery investment. See appendix 2 for further details.
Capital stock
We start by deriving annual, rather than quarterly, constant-price capital stock data. Specifically, we use the standard, constant-price capital accumulation identity:
where the variables are:
The real investment data are the annual equivalent of the data described above, dating back to 1948 for aggregate plant and machinery and to 1976 for computers. For depreciation rates, we follow Oulton (2001a) and use US depreciation rates from Fraumeni (1997) . For non-computer plant and machinery, we assume a (constant) annual depreciation rate of 13%. For computers, we assume a (constant) depreciation rate of 31.5%. The (time-varying) real aggregate implied depreciation rate for plant and machinery is a weighted average of these rates, the weights being their constant-price shares in the aggregate capital stock in the previous period.
For aggregate plant and machinery, the initial stock in 1947 is provided by the ONS. This value is also used for non-computer plant and machinery. For computers, the initial value in 1975 is from Oulton (2001a). The initial stocks for our quarterly series are then taken from these endyear annual observations, and quarterly capital stocks calculated using the above capital accumulation approach (26) .
Real user cost of capital
We construct Hall-Jorgensen real user cost of capital measures for aggregate plant and machinery and, at the asset level, for computers and non-computers. These measures take the form: ______________________________________________________________________________________________ (26) For aggregate plant and machinery, the quarterly real investment series begins in 1965Q1, so the annual capital stock series provides the 1964 Q4 observation. For computers, the annual series provides the 1975 Q4 observation.
where the variables are: For aggregate plant and machinery, the price of capital goods is the ONS deflator implicit in the published constant and current price investment series (TLPW/DLWO). For computers, we again use the relevant ONS PPI series. The price of output is measured by the GDP deflator (ABML/ABMM). Given that the expected change in the relative price of investment goods is unobservable, we use a proxy: an eight-quarter average of the actual relative price. The real cost of finance measure is the ratio of Private Non-Financial Corporations' profits (specifically, gross operating surplus less tax and depreciation) to the current financial valuation of the corporate sector (27) . At the asset level, depreciation rates are as discussed above. For aggregate plant and machinery, we follow the standard approach and assume a constant depreciation rate. A 'tax factor' series, capturing the impact of taxes and allowances on the cost of capital, is supplied by HMT.
______________________________________________________________________________________________ (27) This approach is taken in Flemming et al (1976) . As discussed by Whitaker (1998), the real cost of finance is the rate at which a company's future real earnings are discounted by the capital market in valuing the securities upon which those earnings will accrue. Assuming that (unobservable) real earnings in future years are equal to current earnings, a measure of the real cost of finance is therefore the ratio of current real earnings to the market value of a firm's liabilities.
Appendix 2: Backing out non-computer investment from total investment
This annex considers how to construct the series that the ONS would have arrived at, had they decided to exclude computer investment from total investment in "Other machinery and equipment" (OME). Hence we aim to produce a series which is fully consistent with the national accounts. We have ONS data on total investment in "Other machinery and equipment" (OME) and also on a component of OME, computer investment, in both constant and current prices, for the period 1976-2000. We want to derive investment in OME excluding computers (OMEXC).
There is no problem in doing this in current prices by simple subtraction, but how to do it in constant prices is not so straightforward.
The chain-linked solution
For the period 1994 to the present, the ONS uses 1995 prices. So for this period we can indeed calculate OMEXC by subtracting computer investment in 1995 prices from total OME in 1995 prices. But prior to 1994 the ONS used different weights : successively 1990, 1985, 1980 and 1975 prices as we go back in time. In other words the ONS does not use fixed base indices but instead a type of chain index in which the weights are periodically updated (about every 5 years in practice) (28) .
For each of the periods over which the weights are constant, the index of OME investment is in effect constructed by the ONS as follows:
where QOME is the index of total investment, set equal to 1 in the base year, QCOMP is a similar index for computer investment, QOMEXC is the index for other plant and machinery, and w is the weight for computers. This weight is the nominal share of computer investment in the total in the base year (successively 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995) . We can find the OME index for (say) 1984 relative to 1985 by dividing OME investment in 1995 prices for 1984 by OME investment in 1995 prices for 1985. This works because rebasing to 1995 prices does not change growth rates for earlier periods. We can calculate the COMP index similarly. Therefore for each period covered by a singe base, we can solve this equation for QOMEXC: (28) For this reason saying that such indices are "in 1995 prices" or "in constant prices" is potentially misleading. It might be better to say that these series are in "chained 1995 pounds" (copying the BEA usage of "chained 1996 dollars").
We can then link all these fixed base index numbers together, so that we have a type of chain index which covers the whole period. This chain index can be referenced to any year we choose, without changing its growth rate. Suppose we choose 1995 as the reference year when the index takes the value 1. Then we can multiply the chain index in each year by the nominal value of OMEXC in 1995, thus obtaining OMEXC in constant 1995 prices.
To illustrate the process, consider the following imaginary data for an OMEXC index calculated using equation (A4). Here the base periods are assumed to be periods 1 and 4 and the link period is 3. When the reference period for the chain index is period 4, the value of the index in eg period 2 is calculated as (1.05 ÷ 1.07) x 0.95.
Non-additivity
In general, chain indices are non-additive: the components do not necessarily sum to the total. In other words, if we add OMEXC in 1995 prices to COMP in 1995 prices, the result will not be equal to OME in 1995 prices, except for the period 1994 to the present when the ONS has used 1995 as the base. If the component (computers) which is growing more rapidly has a falling relative price, as is the case here, then the ONS's chain index of OME grows more rapidly than the sum of the components before the base year, here 1995. This is because the sum of the components in 1995 prices is just a fixed base index of investment, the base being 1995. It then follows that the level of the ONS's chain index for OME is less than the sum of the components in constant prices in all years prior to 1994:
In other words, our (and implicitly the ONS's) chain-based estimate of the non-computer component (OMEXC) will be greater than the estimate one would obtain by naively subtracting computer investment from total investment, in all years prior to 1994. Consequently, the growth rate of OMEXC will be less than the growth rate of the naïve (fixed base) estimate prior to 1995, since the levels are the same from 1994 onwards.
This is illustrated in charts A1 and A2. The level of the naïve, fixed base index is 25% below that of the chain index of OMEXC in 1976. Between 1976 and 1994 the fixed base index grew at 2.34% pa, while the chain index grew at only 0.76% pa. Putting it another way, the sum of computer investment (COMP) and the new chain series of the total excluding computers (OMEXC) exceeds the actual total of OME investment by a growing amount as we go back further in time. By 1976 the sum of the two components exceeds the total by 33%. But to reiterate, this is just a consequence of chain-linking in the form used up to now by the ONS. That the difference between the two types of estimate is so large reflects the substantial fall in the relative price of computers which occurred over this period. If we had used the more rapidly falling US price index for computers, instead of the UK one, the difference would have been even more striking. But in order to ensure consistency with the other ONS data, our aim here is to construct the series for non-computer investment which the ONS would have arrived at themselves had they chosen to do so and so we employ their methods and data. 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Naive Chain % pa Appendix 3: Econometric results 
Appendix 4: Sensitivity analysis
How sensitive are these results to potential mismeasurement? In this section, we examine the implications of using alternative approaches to constructing our UK dataset. We identify two key areas of data uncertainty. First, in the absence of quarterly computer investment data, we have adopted an interpolation technique that made use of the indicator information contained in plant and machinery investment data (see appendix 1). Although the annual growth rates of current price computer investment and plant and machinery investment appear quite closely related, the relationship on a quarterly frequency may be poor. We examine the impact of using an alternative, a more simple linear interpolation technique.
Second, great uncertainty surrounds our estimates of the real user cost of capital. We consider alternative measures of each component. In particular, we examine the implications of using an alternative measure of computer investment prices, based on US computer investment price data; a weighted average cost of capital as a measure of the real cost of finance in the user cost; two alternative proxies for expected relative price inflation (actual relative price inflation and, as in Tevlin and Whelan (2001) , a three-year moving average); an alternative tax factor measure (30) ; and for aggregate plant and machinery equations, a time-varying real aggregate implied average depreciation rate, rather than a constant.
We re-estimated our computer equations for all of the alternative approaches (31) . These changes have no material impact on our results. That is illustrated by Table A4 , which shows the impact of these changes on the elasticity of substitution in our investment growth equation (10) for computers (32) . (31) We also adjusted other affected data. For example, the alternative interpolation procedure has implications for our capital stock estimates as well as for investment. In the case of alternative computer prices, we also adjusted computer investment and computer capital stock data. Strictly speaking, the use of US computer price data additionally requires adjustment of our GDP data. It seems unlikely that this would have any material impact on the results presented in Table A4 .
(32) The alternative regression results are available on request.
